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capacity as a Director of the Northeastern PA Hospital 
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Northeastern Pennsylvania Hospital and Education 
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capacity as a Director of the Northeastern PA Hospital 
and Education Authority; NORTHEASTERN PA HOSPITAL 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Circuit Judge. 
 
Lewis Wetzel brought suit to challenge his discharge as 
Solicitor for the defendant Northeast Pennsylvania Hospital 
and Education Association. The district court granted 
summary judgment for defendants on the ground that 
Wetzel was a high level public employee, who was 
sufficiently involved in policy making to make political 
affiliation a legitimate consideration for his continued 
employment. Wetzel's appeal presents the recurring 
question of the nature and extent of the exception to the 
general principle, announced in Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 
347 (1976), and its progeny, that a public employee who is 
discharged because of his political affiliation has been 
deprived of First Amendment rights. We will affirm. 
 
I. 
 
The Northeastern Pennsylvania Hospital and Education 
Authority was created by Ordinance of the Luzerne County 
Commissioners to provide tax exempt status to bonds 
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issued under the provisions of the Municipal Authorities 
Act of 1945, 53 Pa. Cons. Stat. SS 301-22 (West 1997), at 
the request of health care providers and educational 
institutions throughout northeastern Pennsylvania. 
Pursuant to its charter, Luzerne County's three 
Commissioners appoint the Authority's Board of Directors. 
The Board consists of five members, who serve staggered 
five-year terms that expire in consecutive years. Prior to 
December 31, 1993, the Authority's Board consisted of Dr. 
Charles Carpenter, Chair; Peter Mailloux, Vice Chair; 
George Ruckno, Jr., Assistant Secretary/Treasurer; 
Jeanette Dombroski, and Yvonne Bozinski. Carpenter, 
Mailloux, and Ruckno were Republicans, and Dombroski 
and Bozinski were Democrats. 
 
On March 17, 1994, a newly-elected Democratic majority 
of Commissioners appointed Democrat Peter Butera to 
replace Ruckno, whose term of office had expired on 
December 31, 1993. On March 31, 1994, the Board held a 
reorganization meeting at which the Directors elected 
Democrat Bozinski to serve as the Board Chair, Democrat 
Butera as Vice-Chair, and Democrat Dombroski as 
Treasurer. The Directors also voted to remove appellant 
Wetzel, a Republican, from his position as Authority 
Solicitor and replace him with attorney John P. Moses, a 
Democrat. Wetzel was, and had been, an at-will employee of 
the Authority who had served as its Solicitor for the 
previous ten years. 
 
Wetzel thereupon initiated a civil action under 42 U.S.C. 
S 1983 seeking both compensatory and punitive damages 
arising from his discharge as Solicitor. He sued Rose 
Tucker and Frank Crossin, the two Democratic Luzerne 
County Commissioners who were serving at the time of his 
discharge; Bozinski, Butera, and Dombroski, the three 
Democratic Authority Directors who were serving at the 
time; and the Authority itself. Wetzel alleged that, because 
his discharge was based solely on his affiliation with the 
Republican Party, the defendants violated his First and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights to political association and 
due process. 
 
After the close of discovery, defendants moved for 
summary judgment, contending that, as an at-will 
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employee, Wetzel possessed no property interest in his 
employment subject to protection under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. In the alternative, they argued that political 
party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the 
effective performance of the duties of Authority Solicitor. 
Wetzel cross-moved for partial summary judgment on the 
issue of liability, asserting that the record established that 
he was terminated for political reasons in contravention of 
his First Amendment rights of association. The district 
court granted defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
and denied Wetzel's Cross-Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, concluding that Wetzel's discharge was 
permissible because political affiliation is an appropriate 
criterion for the effective performance of the duties of the 
Authority Solicitor.1 This timely appeal followed. Our 
familiar standard of review is set forth in the margin.2 
 
II. 
 
As in any case involving the accusation of a politically- 
motivated discharge of a public employee, we turn first to 
the Supreme Court's decisions in Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The District Court properly rejected defendants' contention that 
Wetzel's at-will employment status had relevance to his First Amendment 
claim. See Wetzel v. Tucker, No. 3:94-CV-660, mem. op. at 6 n.3 (M.D. 
Pa. March 24, 1997). The Court concluded that, while Wetzel's lack of 
entitlement to his position as Solicitor might bar a substantive due 
process claim, it was not relevant to an action grounded in the free 
speech and association principles of the First Amendment. Id. (citing 
Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 72 (1990)). 
 
2. We review a summary judgment de novo. See Sempier v. Johnson and 
Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 727 (3d Cir. 1995). Summary judgment is 
appropriate only when the admissible evidence fails to demonstrate a 
genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c). When, as here, the 
nonmoving party bears the burden of persuasion at trial, the moving 
party may meet its burden on summary judgment by showing that the 
nonmoving party's evidence is insufficient to carry that burden. The 
nonmoving party creates a genuine issue of material fact if he provides 
sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find for him at trial. 
We 
give the nonmoving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences. Bray 
v. Marriott Hotels, 110 F.3d 986, 989 (3d Cir. 1997). 
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347 (1976), and Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980). In 
Elrod, the Court held that discharging certain public 
employees solely on the basis of their political affiliation 
infringes upon their First Amendment rights to belief and 
free association. See Elrod, 427 U.S. at 355-57. The Court, 
however, specifically exempted from this general prohibition 
the politically-motivated discharge of persons who hold 
confidential or policy making positions. Id. at 367-68. In 
articulating this exception, the Court noted that there is 
"[n]o clear line . . . between policy making and 
nonpolicymaking positions," but offered instruction by 
suggesting that "consideration should . . . be given to 
whether the employee acts as an advisor or formulates 
plans for the implementation of broad policy goals." Id. at 
368. 
 
In Branti, the Court addressed the difficulty in the wake 
of Elrod of determining whether, in a given situation, 
political affiliation is a legitimate factor for a public hiring 
authority to consider. Branti, 445 U.S. at 518. Refining its 
prior analysis, the Court observed that "the ultimate 
inquiry is not whether the label of `policymaker' or 
`confidential' fits a particular position; rather, the question 
is whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party 
affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective 
performance of the public office involved." Id. See also Ness 
v. Marshall, 660 F.2d 517, 521 (3d Cir. 1981) (noting that 
Branti calls for a "functional analysis" and concluding that 
"should a difference in party affiliation be highly likely to 
cause an official to be ineffective in carrying out the duties 
and responsibilities of the office, dismissals for that reason 
would not offend the First Amendment"). 
 
The character of this inquiry is inherently fact-specific in 
that it requires a court to examine the nature of the 
responsibilities of the particular job at issue. See Zold v. 
Township of Mantua, 935 F.2d 633, 635 (3d Cir. 1991). 
Importantly, this inquiry is focused on "the function of the 
public office in question and not the actual past duties of 
the particular employee involved." Brown v. Trench, 787 
F.2d 167, 168 (3d Cir. 1986); see also Waskovich v. 
Morgano, 2 F.3d 1292, 1297 (3d Cir. 1993); Burns v. County 
of Cambria, Pa., 971 F.2d 1015, 1022 (3d Cir. 1993); cf. 
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Furlong v. Gudknecht, 808 F.2d 233, 236 (3d Cir. 1986). 
Other circuits have used a similar analysis, as we 
document in the margin.3 We have held, however, that 
evidence of past job duties may in some cases be 
informative. See Peters v. Delaware River Port Auth., 16 
F.3d 1346, 1353 (3d Cir. 1994); Waskovich, 2 F.3d at 1300. 
 
III. 
 
Wetzel contends that political affiliation is not an 
appropriate criterion for the position of Authority Solicitor. 
He characterizes the Authority simply as a "conduit" 
through which tax-exempt bonds are funneled to health 
care and educational institutions. Citing the facts that the 
Authority's sole purpose is to serve as a financing 
mechanism to issue these bonds, that it meets infrequently 
(only when an institution requests a bond issue), and that 
it has never turned down a bond request, Wetzel submits 
that the Authority is a reactive, non-policy making body. 
 
In contrast, the defendants maintain that the Authority is 
a policy making body whose Solicitor may be terminated 
appropriately based on his political affiliation. In their 
submission, the Authority's enabling legislation, as well as 
the record testimony, compel the conclusion that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. See Williams v. City of River Rouge, 909 F.2d 151, 154 (6th Cir. 1990) 
("When examining a public office for first amendment protection against 
politically-motivated dismissal, the relevant focus of analysis is the 
inherent duties of the position in question, not the work actually 
performed by the person who happens to occupy the office."); Tomczak 
v. City of Chicago, 765 F.2d 633, 641 (7th Cir. 1985) ("[I]f an 
officeholder 
performs fewer or less important functions than usually attend his 
position, he may still be exempt from the prohibition against political 
terminations if his position inherently encompasses tasks that render 
his political affiliation an appropriate prerequisite for effective 
performance."). One Court of Appeals adopting this approach has gone 
so far as to hold that it may preclude altogether consideration of actual 
past job duties. See O'Connor v. Steeves, 994 F.2d 905, 911 (1st Cir. 
1993) ("[T]he actual past duties of the discharged employee are irrelevant 
if the position inherently encompasses more expansive powers and more 
important functions that would tend to make political affiliation an 
appropriate requirement for effective performance") (internal quotations 
omitted). 
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Authority's Solicitor acts as an advisor with regard to policy 
matters, thereby placing political affiliation legitimately 
among the criteria for the position. 
 
Based on these competing contentions regarding both the 
general role of the Authority and the particular 
responsibilities of its Solicitor, our inquiry is by necessity 
two-fold. We must first address whether the Authority is a 
policy making body, because if it is not, it would be 
impossible for the Authority to demonstrate that the party 
affiliation of the Solicitor is an appropriate requirement for 
his effective performance. Answering this in the affirmative, 
we then turn to the central issue of our inquiry: whether 
the Authority has shown that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether political party affiliation is an 
appropriate criterion for the effective job performance of the 
Authority's Solicitor. Because we believe that the Authority 
has met this burden as a matter of law, we conclude that 
the position of Solicitor is one that falls within the 
exception laid out in Elrod and its progeny. 
 
A. 
 
To determine whether the Authority is a policy-making 
body, we turn first to the Municipal Authorities Act of 1945, 
53 Pa. Cons. Stat. SS 301-322, which established the 
Authority. Contrary to plaintiff's claim that the Authority is 
a mere "conduit" through which bond fundsflow, the Act 
confers upon the Authority a broad range of powers, many 
of which implicate substantial policy matters. For example, 
S 306B(n) confers upon the Authority the power"[t]o do all 
acts and things necessary or convenient for the promotion 
of its business and the general welfare of the Authority, to 
carry out the powers granted to it by this act or any other 
acts." (emphasis supplied) This is an expansive grant. The 
section not only charges the Authority with ensuring its 
continued operation, but it also grants the Authority the 
discretionary power to decide how to conduct its operations. 
If the Pennsylvania legislature meant for the Authority to 
serve simply as a conduit through which tax exempt 
financing is obtained by health care providers and 
educational institutions, it would not have included 
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language that allowed for such clear policy making 
discretion. 
 
The district court analyzed the matter as follows: 
 
       The Authority's decisions regarding the issuance of 
       bonds for such projects as long-term nursing care 
       centers and personal care facilities necessarily involve 
       public policy implications. Many times, the feasibility 
       and continued existence of such facilities are directly 
       dependent on the Authority's approval of tax-exempt 
       bonding. Public policy considerations, such as the 
       present need for these types of facilities in certain 
       geographic areas, are almost certain to factor into the 
       decisions regarding the issuance of bonds to these 
       entities. 
 
Wetzel v. Tucker, mem. op. at 12. We agree. Noting that 
these are but a few of the potential circumstances under 
which the Authority may assert its policy making power, we 
reject Wetzel's claim that the Authority is a reactive, non- 
policy making body. 
 
B. 
 
Turning to the question whether Authority Solicitor is a 
position for which political affiliation is an appropriate 
criterion, we must assess the level of input that the office 
of Solicitor has on matters of public policy. We have twice 
addressed this issue in cases involving the discharge of 
government lawyers. In Ness v. Marshall, supra, we 
affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of a city 
whose incoming mayor, upon taking office, had discharged 
the previous administration's city solicitor and assistant 
city solicitor. In rejecting the claim that political affiliation 
was not an appropriate criterion for those positions, we 
noted that the attorneys in question performed various 
functions that were "intimately related to city policy." Id. at 
522. Specifically, we noted that both the city solicitor and 
the assistant solicitor rendered legal advice to the 
administration, drafted ordinances, and negotiated 
contracts for the city. See id. As such, we concluded that, 
in filling these positions, "the mayor ha[d] the right to 
receive the complete cooperation and loyalty of a trusted 
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advisor, and should not [have been] expected to settle for 
less." Id. 
 
Our conclusion was the same for the position of assistant 
district attorney. In Mummau v. Ranck, 687 F.2d 9 (3d Cir. 
1982), we affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor 
of a county district attorney, determining that, as a matter 
of law, political affiliation is an appropriate criterion for the 
position of assistant district attorney. The district court had 
observed that the position entailed decisionmaking as to 
the allocation of the county's scarce resources and the 
prosecution of particular individuals and classes of crime. 
See Mummau v. Ranck, 531 F. Supp. 402, 405 (E.D. Pa. 
1982). We agreed, rejecting the contention that an attorney 
with this type of input into governmental policy making 
operates in a purely technical or ministerial manner. See 
Mummau, 687 F.2d at 10. 
 
Notably, in both Ness and Mummau, we focused on the 
authorized functions and duties of the office in question 
rather then on the responsibilities of the particular 
attorneys at issue. See Ness, 660 F.2d at 521 ("That a city 
solicitor in a similar position could conceivably operate in 
such a legal/technical manner is a possibility that need not 
concern us here."); Mummau, 687 F.2d at 10 ("That an 
assistant district attorney `could conceivably operate in 
such a legal/technical manner,' or that appellant in fact so 
limited himself to the role described is irrelevant.") (quoting 
Ness). 
 
We see no material difference between the roles played by 
the attorneys in Ness and Mummau, and that played by 
Wetzel. This is especially so in light of the broad 
discretionary power conferred by S 306B(n) and the role 
that the advice of counsel would have in shaping policy 
decisions. Assume, for example, that the Board was 
pondering whether to pursue an affirmative action policy 
that would seek a minority underwriter for one of its bonds, 
but realized that the policy would probably be challenged. 
Or assume that a Board considering a bond funding 
application from a private drug rehabilitation clinic that 
proposed to build a huge facility within the borders of 
Luzerne County reasonably feared that the local community 
might oppose the project on legal (or other) grounds. The 
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advice of counsel as to the legality of these actions, and 
whether or not it was worthwhile to defend them in 
litigation should that become necessary, would inform 
these policy decisions in a very direct way. 
 
Wetzel responds that the Board of Commissioners could 
rely on the Solicitor's objective legal advice in these 
situations, uninfluenced by his personal beliefs. That 
response, however, is simplistic. Tough legal questions are 
not answered mechanically, but rather by the exercise of 
seasoned judgment. Judgment is informed by experience 
and perspective, and any evaluation of the risks involved in 
such a decision (including the determination as to whether 
it is advisable to pursue litigation) is informed, in turn, by 
values. Moreover, as the foregoing discussion suggests, 
these issues are not purely legal; clients employ counsel to 
assess whether the goals are indeed worth the risks. 4 As 
such, to be confident in its Solicitor's advice on matters 
"intimately related" to Authority policy, the Board must 
have the right to demand that his loyalties lie with it and 
its agenda. Ness, 660 F.2d at 522. Given the political 
ramifications of any attendant legal advice, confidence 
sometimes may come only with the assurance that the 
Solicitor shares the same political ideology as the Board. 
These situations are exactly the types for which the 
Supreme Court created the Elrod/Branti exception.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Cf. Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 2.1 cmt. (Supp. 
1997) (a lawyer should advise a client on the social and political 
ramifications of a particular action). 
 
5. Wetzel also argues that Commissioner Frank Crossin's testimony that, 
in his opinion, political affiliation was not a criterion for the position 
of 
Solicitor precludes summary judgment. We disagree. Where, as here, the 
objective evidence leads us to conclude that, as a matter of law, a person 
occupied a policy-making position, the lay opinion of someone in 
Crossin's position is rendered irrelevant. Indeed, we believe that were 
such opinions sufficient to preclude summary judgment, it would raise 
the specter, admittedly not present here, of permitting a plaintiff to 
avoid 
summary judgment simply by finding a Commissioner, who may have 
any number of motives, to characterize the job one way or another, 
perhaps in view of changed political alliances. 
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C. 
 
It is clear from this record that the Authority's Solicitor 
"has meaningful input into decision making concerning a 
major [government] program." Brown, 787 F.2d at 169-70. 
As the analysis in Part III.B makes clear, the District Court 
was correct when it observed that "Wetzel's argument that 
the role of Authority Solicitor is limited to rendering 
technical legal advice, far removed from political concerns, 
plainly ignores the extent to which the Authority's attorney 
may be involved in matters of substantial importance to the 
community." Wetzel v. Tucker, mem. op. at 14. We conclude 
that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
political party affiliation is an appropriate criterion for the 
effective job performance of the Authority's Solicitor. 
Rather, as a matter of law, political affiliation is an 
appropriate criterion for the position. The judgment of the 
District Court will therefore be affirmed. 
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